France’s President Macron says Europe must “wake up” to defend itself as Trump returns

As President Trump cemented his return to the White House, French President Emmanuel Macron told his European counterparts this week to “wake up” and spend more on the continent’s defense to reduce the continent’s reliance on the United States for security. 

“What will we do in Europe tomorrow if our American ally withdraws its warships from the Mediterranean? If they send their fighter jets from the Atlantic to the Pacific?” Macron said Monday, addressing members of the French military.

President Trump has often criticized America’s NATO allies for failing to meet domestic defense spending targets. At a February 2024 campaign rally in South Carolina, he said he’d encourage Russia to “do whatever the hell they want” to NATO allies who don’t meet the target.

In the Oval Office on Monday, Mr. Trump repeated a demand he first made in January that NATO “needs to pay 5%.” Under a 2014 agreement made by the group, the alliance’s more than 30 member states committed to aim to spend at least 2% of the value of their domestic economies on defense every year. During his first term in office, Mr. Trump pressured America’s allies to meet that threshold, and some have increased their military spending since that time, but many still do not make the 2% bar.

In his remarks just two days after the U.S. election in November, Macron called on Europeans “to believe in our sovereignty and strategic autonomy” and to decrease reliance on U.S. military hardware and defense leadership.

CBS News has spoken with analysts and former officials from several European countries and NATO following the U.S. election. The experts, from Poland, Italy, Germany, the U.K. and the NATO alliance itself, vary in their assessments of the feasibility of Macron’s broad vision, but they largely agree that Europe can and should cooperate more closely and spend more money on defense.

The direct quotes below have been edited for length and clarity.

Poland – Professor Katarzyna Pisarska

Chair, Warsaw Security Forum 

Speaking on Macron’s comments:

You have to remember that Macron’s vision is not really a detail-oriented, ready-to-go project. It is an idea that has been discussed in Europe, and throughout the last two years, but the general direction is that we are not building anything that would be competitive to NATO. Rather, we would be creating capabilities, especially defense capabilities, that would help and strengthen the European defense pillar of NATO. 

The idea that we would go alone without the United States has been rejected by almost all, if not all, EU and NATO member states.

On defense spending:

Poland currently buys 80% of all its military stocks from the United States. It’s heavily dependent on American air missile defense systems. These are not things that you can detangle or unbundle from overnight. So the majority of countries — especially from the NATO eastern flank — will tell you we will absolutely not go alone without the United States. There is no way that France, and even less so Germany, can step up to deliver the type of technological capabilities that are needed to substitute for the Americans on the ground here in Europe.

Discussion has moved in the direction that it has been moving pre-Trump election: Europe has to step up with NATO, start producing more, start spending more, also developing its own capabilities. We also need to have a number of different defense elements that we procure and create by ourselves, and that should be also understandable to our American partners, although when I spoke with congressmen in April, not all of them understood that it is okay for Europeans to spend money on European equipment and not only on American or Korean equipment.

On Ukraine: 

Maybe President Emmanuel Macron has some idea since [the U.S. election] that he can yet again push the idea that European strategic autonomy is really complete independent from the United States. But I will say it again: From countries that are on the forefront of this war [in Ukraine], for countries that will have to be the first battleground of this war, which is the NATO eastern flank, that is not negotiable.

We will have to do more and we will be doing more. I think what is unclear in the United States is that Europe already delivers 50% of military aid to Ukraine and 90% of financial and refugee aid to Ukraine. So stepping up has already happened to a large extent.

It has to happen more. We need to have more troops. We have to be prepared to defend ourselves, but having America as an ally, not a competitor, I think this is what is very important to understand.

U.K. – Alistair Burt

Former Member of U.K. Parliament and minister of state for the Middle East at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and minister of state at the Department for International Development

On Macron’s comments:

We have known for some time that the United States, under whatever leadership, would be asking Europeans to spend more on their defense, and what Trump’s election has done has catalyzed that now. I think you have to take people at their word, and what Trump has said about NATO in the past and what people have said about European defense, rings true. I think he’s [Macron] making the point that in the end, it’s up to us. You’re either a supplicant or you’re making the weather. And there’s no reason why we should just roll over and take the world as President Trump is going to try and define it. It will still, I’m absolutely certain, be in the interests of the West to act together, but we cannot take that for granted any longer, and I think Macron is right to seize upon it. 

On defense spending:

I noticed that Macron’s speech sort of offered the invitation to those outside the EU to be part of this wider European political community that the United Kingdom has made very clear it intends to be part of. I think the United Kingdom does have a role to play in this. Clearly our military is a very important part of NATO and will always be, but I would very much believe it is in the United Kingdom’s interest to act with the wider European community. It bolsters them, strengthens them, and it’s in our own interests. We at least have begun to spend more on defense. Other states will have more catching up to do but I do see it in the U.K.’s political and economic and military interests to be active in relation to what Macron has been saying. 

On Ukraine:

All the rhetoric has been absolutely right, we cannot afford to let Russia win. You have the Baltic states very anxious, you have [countries] with Russian enclaves that could allow Putin to say, there are Russian people here, so we will defend their interests just as we purported to do in Ukraine. How would [those countries] feel if there was some sense that Ukraine was not being supported?  

On the other hand, if you take out the United States’ economic and military support that is asking a great deal of the rest of us to make up. I think the rhetoric is very, very clear, in that everybody has said we will stand with Ukraine as long as it takes, and there can’t be any weakening in that. The moment you’ve got any possibility of that weakening, then you’re effectively giving the game away. 

If there is to be some sort of U.S.-brokered negotiation [for Ukraine], clearly [Ukrainian President Volodymyr] Zelenskyy wants to be in the strongest possible position. And to do that, he’s got to be able to enter those negotiations with the clear determination of the rest of Europe behind him to say whatever happens, we won’t let you down, but if it goes on for two, four, five years, who knows?

I don’t think Europe can say anything other than what it’s saying, and again, I think you have to take us at our word. 

NATO – Gen. Sir Richard Shirreff

Former NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe

On Macron’s comments:

Let’s nail this for once and for all: There is one effective military alliance in Europe – a political-military alliance in Europe, in the trans-Atlantic region — and it’s called NATO. NATO has a command structure. It has a doctrine. It practices regularly. It is used to moving and commanding military forces at real scale. What is the point of trying to create something where we’ve got 70 years, 75 years of experience with NATO? Now, of course, the problem is, what happens if America, under Trump, either pulls out of NATO, which is unlikely, or reduces its support to NATO, which is possible?

The solution to that, frankly, is not to start blathering on about new formations under the European Union. It’s to lean into NATO and damn well start spending money. Why is Trump and why are America likely to pull a rug from under NATO, if they do? Because the French, the Germans, the British, the Spanish, the Italians, have simply not pulled their weight in defense spending terms for most of the 75 years of NATO’s existence, or certainly, at least the last, certainly the last 30 years. So, lean into NATO and really double down on NATO and double down on defense spending.

On defense spending:

There is one good thing, though, that the European Union can do, which is defense industries. If they can get a grip of European defense procurement in order to offset the current dependence on the Americans in order to standardize weaponry. It is ridiculous for the British to continue with its own cottage industry of making tanks, when actually the rest of Europe buys Leopard IIs, which is a perfectly good tank, from Rheinmetall [in Germany]. 

This is going to require some real political boldness, and it is going to require a pooling and a sharing of sovereignty. It’s going to require individual nations like Britain to say, okay, we’re not going to make a tank. We’ll buy the Leopard II. 

On NATO:

If you start building large numbers of European [non-NATO] headquarters, they’ve got to come from somewhere – a European command structure. What it means is that NATO will suffer. You know, I was the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, one of many Brits that go back to Montgomery. The Germans have the Chief of Staff. The Chairman of the Military Committee is a Dutchman at the moment, and he or she rotates the commanders of the joint force commands. Europe has a leading role in NATO. Europeans have leading roles in NATO. But it all comes down to really leaning in and being able to produce the troop numbers, the ships, the planes, that NATO needs to really provide an effective deterrence.

Germany – Norbert Roetgen

Former Chair, Bundestag (German parliament) Foreign Affairs Committee

On Macron’s comments:

I think this definitely now is the hour of Europe, a European moment, when we have to prepare that, quite probably, America, under the Trump presidency, will stop any financial or military support for Ukraine. But perhaps we also are going to see the attempt to strike a deal between Trump and Putin, so this now means that European security definitely has to become European. So either we stand up or we give up. 

However, I think we, the Europeans, are not prepared, despite all the evidence that this had to be expected. Europeans are not prepared, so we have to quickly catch up. It’s possible, and the political will is what is lacking most, but we will have to act in a very pragmatic way.

On Ukraine:

We have to act in a very pragmatic way to quickly and more substantially support Ukraine, and this means that we have to compensate for the American support in terms of weapons and ammunition delivery and, in the short term, this would mean that the Europeans would have to buy weapons and ammunition on the international market, and in the mid- and longer term we will have to enhance our capabilities to better coordinate, to create bigger markets in order to scale our economies in the area of defense.

Up to now, there is no sufficient political will to do what is necessary to support Ukraine in order to enable Ukraine to defend itself against Russian aggression. Otherwise, the military situation on the battleground would be different. We are going to see that the United States is not contributing as they have done in the past, so there is a lack of political will, and there is only one way to change this course, and this is by doing more.

This would mean that all European member states like Poland, Germany and France come together and invite other countries; for example, Britain— we should go beyond the EU because it’s about the entire European architecture of security— come together. And when they come together, they should bring with them substantial additional contributions in terms of money and in terms of weapons and ammunition, and this should be done in the short term. And then they should devise a plan on how to make this a structured effort and what is necessary to be done to better coordinate, to enhance the support necessary for the defense of Ukraine. It should be done very substantially in terms of money and weapons. There are no further words needed. What is needed are deeds.

On NATO:

Of course, it’s in the European strategic interest to be a strong part of NATO, to keep the Americans in Europe. This is not against anybody, but it is only to contribute in a stronger way to what is at the heart and what is the core of NATO, and that is European security.

Italy – Natalie Tocci

Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali, and former special adviser to the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs 

On Macron’s comments:

He’s been saying this for a long time, and in a sense the vision was right back then, and it’s even more right now. He started talking about European strategic autonomy in 2017, and there wasn’t a lot of appetite and traction behind the idea, given that it has traditionally been mistakenly interpreted as something that runs counter to the transatlantic relationship. So obviously now with Trump, a good idea that was good back then becomes politically relevant today.

From the general concept of the idea to the action, there’s a big gap, and he hasn’t put forward any new concrete ideas in that respect.

Generally what tends to happen is Macron says something, everyone else criticizes him, but no one really puts forward an alternative vision. So God bless Macron for at least kind of having an idea, and I think in this particular case it’s even a good idea, and I do think that the election of Donald Trump is going to galvanize some action, but I’m very skeptical that the kind of action that is going to be insufficient relative to what we have to do.

On defense spending:

We’re basically talking about 100 billion euros a year ($104 billion) for several years alongside all member states beginning to spend between 2-and-4% of GDP. This is not going to happen overnight. 

There’s no antagonism between the EU and NATO, because, frankly speaking, as we’re in the midst of a war, we can’t really afford to have sort of academic conversations about the EU and NATO. What the EU can contribute is on providing the regulatory and financial incentives for Europeans to do more on defense together.

However, I think there is a lot there to be worked on, and especially if some of these countries begin or increasingly pursue projects collectively. If you think about France, Italy on air defense, think about the Italian-German project on a new tank, there’s a lot there that can be worked on.

Does it mean that Europeans would have all defense capacities? Probably not, or certainly not in the short term, so there’s still a lot of dependence on the US and US defense industry.

This is not a question of just completely being self-reliant on your own defense industry, but certainly there’s a lot more the European defense industry can do and a lot more that governments can do to support that consolidation and cooperation within the defense industry in Europe.