Nigeria’s government is using digital technology to repress citizens. A researcher explains how

Digital authoritarianism is a new way governments are trying to control citizens using digital and information technology. It is a growing concern for advocacy groups and those interested in freedom and democracy. It is especially worrying for those who initially heralded digital and information technologies as liberating tools that would spread information more easily for citizens.

I have studied the rise of digital authoritarianism in Africa over the last two decades. My most recent study focused on Nigeria, and its turn to digital tools for control after the 2020 #EndSARS Movement protests.

I found that local conflict and development needs drive the Nigerian government’s demand for digital authoritarianism technologies. Foreign suppliers of these technologies are motivated by both economic gain and influence in the region.

The findings are important. Firstly, it signals that the trend of using digital spaces to control populations has reached the African continent. It also shows that the trend is facilitated by foreign actors that provide governments with the technology and expertise.

What is digital authoritarianism?

One way to understand the concept of digital authoritarianism is as a form of governance or set of actions aimed at undermining accountability. It is the use of digital technologies for this goal.

Technology is used to repress voices, keep people under surveillance, and manipulate populations for regime goals and survival.

It includes but is not limited to internet and social media shutdowns. It prioritizes the use of spyware to hack and monitor people through their devices. There is mass surveillance using artificial intelligence for facial recognition, and misinformation and disinformation propaganda campaigns.

What drives it in Africa

In Africa, these actions are popping up in democracies like Nigeria and in autocracies alike. Perhaps the noticeable difference between these two types of governments is the subtlety of their form of digital authoritarianism and the legal recourse when such actions are unearthed.

Both governance types make claims of national security and public safety to justify these tactics. For instance, former Nigerian information minister Lai Mohammed claimed the 2020 Twitter ban was due to “the persistent use of the platform for activities that are capable of undermining Nigeria’s corporate existence.”

Autocracies are often cruder with their use of blatant tactics. They employ internet and social media shutdowns. This is often due to their unsophisticated digital authoritarianism apparatuses. Democracies often rely on more subtle surveillance and misinformation campaigns to reach their goals.

This all begs the question: what are the drivers of this trend? There are four clear ones:

• regime survival/political control
• security and counterterrorism
• electoral competition and information manipulation
• modernization agendas (development).

On the rise

In the African context, digital authoritarianism is on the rise. There’s a cohesive relationship between the foreign suppliers of the hardware, expertise and domestic demand. This demand stems from authoritarian regimes as well as regimes accessing digital systems to consolidate and modernize. There are also hybrid regimes, which are countries with a mixture of democratic and authoritarian institutions.

States like China, Russia, Israel, France and the US supply both the technology and instruction or best practices to African regimes. Reasons for supply include economic gain and regional influence.

On the demand side, African regimes seek out digital authoritarianism tools mainly for development needs and for conflict resolution. Some of the largest consumers are Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, Nigeria and Ghana.

The study

I found there was evidence that Nigeria’s development goals and efforts to quell conflicts drive the use of technology to repress its people. Using the example of the #EndSARS movement, social media platform shutdowns and efforts to build a firewall akin to China’s great firewall serve as evidence for this.

In the days following Twitter’s removal of a post by President Muhammadu Buhari, Twitter was banned in Nigeria. The administration cited its use to further unrest, instability, and secessionist movements. There were claims that this step was taken to maintain internet sovereignty.

However, the ban also undermined social movements that were successfully holding the government accountable. Following domestic and international outcry over the ban, there were reports that the Nigerian government had approached China. The purpose of the contact was to replicate their “Great Firewall” in Nigeria’s internet control apparatus. (The focus of China’s project is to monitor and censor what can and cannot be seen through an online network in China.) This would allow the state to manage access to certain cities and block unwanted content from reaching Nigerians.

On the supply side, China’s economic commitments to the country and concerted efforts to cultivate certain norms in the country and region offer insights into the motivations for supply in this case and the broader continent.

Again, regime type dictates just how these technologies will be used. Interviews conducted with permanent secretaries and ministers of Nigerian ministries were particularly revealing. They confirmed that repressive government practices in the real world are informing their activity in digital spaces.

For instance, they intimated that the repression that occurs during protests in the streets in order to manage “lawlessness” is being replicated online. Its purpose is to ensure peace and stability.

For development needs, countries like Nigeria initially seek out foreign suppliers to furnish them with state-of-the-art technology systems. The objective is to establish or refurbish their information and communications technology apparatuses.

These include, but are not limited to, national broadband networks) such as fiber optic networks, mobile telecommunications networks and smart city governance systems. Though these are often not repressive in nature, they are capable of dual use. Thus, these developmental needs provide technologies that are then utilized in an authoritarian fashion for state-building goals.

There is also evidence that some suppliers provide instruction on how to use these technologies for repression. In some instances, under the guise of development needs, regimes seek out more repressive tools such as spyware alongside these infrastructural development programs. At this stage, the boundary between development and security blurs, as modernization becomes a vehicle for national security, cyber defense, regime protection, and information control.

What can be done?

I propose a three-pronged approach to address the three drivers. First of all, more has to be done on the international front to curb the sale of repressive tools to states. There must be a conversation about the norms of these technologies and their use for repression in both democracies and autocracies.

On the demand side, it appears those practices that have plagued the hopes of freedom and democracy in the real world have to be addressed. Naturally, no movement on the digital front is complete without a real world manifestation. It seems logical that eradicating digital repression necessitates addressing repression in general.

Finally, regulatory legal and institutional oversight alongside human rights benchmarks must be achieved. These will accompany digital and privacy rights in cyberspace.

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